|
sSc SOCIAL STUDY CIRCLE di
(ESTD 1982) www.dalitindia.com ssc@dalitindia.com *********************************************************************** |
|
March 21, 2004
Letter to Chief Election
Commissioner: Introducing measures to prevent tampering of electoral process
with EVMs
By: Dr. Satinath Choudhary
To
The Chief Election Commissioner of
India
New Delhi
India
Subject: Introducing measures to
prevent tampering of electoral process with EVMs
Dear Sir,
While Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) do prevent invalid votes, and
expedite counting of votes, including accuracy of counts, they also simplify election frauds. Thanks to the
cooperation of a number of individuals from the Election Commission, I have
become familiar with the electronic voting system that is planned to be used. Briefly speaking, my apprehensions are as follows:
1. Supervision of various stages of election by various
individual persons
2. Possible tampering of machines before the poll
3. Possible improper interventions in
votes of illiterate voters seeking help
4. Possible tampering of machines after the poll.
These concerns and solutions are elaborated below:
We are at a very crucial juncture
in our history where our population is very polarized. No individual sitting at
a chair howsoever high or low can be trusted to function without bias. In the
interest of transparency,
accountability and
credibility, we have a triad of Election Commissioners with equal power. It
seems that parity of power of a group adds to the incorruptibility of the
group. Why don’t we extend the
same “triad” principle for all levels of decision-making
process down to the Presiding Officers at various polling booths? In many cases, where we have
several individuals working under one head, all or some of the subordinates may
be promoted to the position of the head and required to work as equals, adding
to transparency. At the lowermost level, wherever we have one individual, they
will need to be replaced by groups of three or more, to improve credibility.
Such a principle, if extended to other power structures of the society and
government, may add to badly needed transparency,
accountability and
credibility of our governing structures.
The computer chips that control the control units of the
voting system (planned
to be used) can be easily
programmed to do all kinds of mischievous things. For example, like
after a certain number of people have voted, the rest of the votes may get
added to a chosen candidate. One can imagine many other mischievous tricks, but the one sited above is enough to make the point I am
trying to make. The kind of wrongdoing mentioned above cannot
be detected by casting a few votes in the beginning of polling and verifying
correct counts for various candidates. It will take hundreds of votes,
involving hundreds of minutes, which the Presiding Officers and polling agents
would not have at their disposal.
The control units keep track of
votes for candidates, recognizing them only by their serial number on the list
of candidates on the polling units. So any tampering of the control unit chip
has to be done after serial number of various candidates in the list of
candidates appearing on polling units have been assigned. The assignments are
done as follows. First, candidates of national parties are listed, followed by
candidates of state parties, registered parties, unregistered parties, and
independents, in that order. The candidates are supposed to be listed in
alphabetical order within the groups mentioned above. Thus after the last day
of withdrawal of nomination, the order of all candidates to be listed on the
polling units is known. Once candidate serial numbers are known, the control
units can be suitably programmed to illicitly benefit any particular candidate,
at the expense of others. Chips programmed in this fashion can be passed on to
wayward Returning Officers (ROs), desirous and willing to benefit a particular
candidate of his or her choice. The ROs have plenty of time at their hand to allow
the pilferage of voting, notwithstanding the
poor and prayerful constables guarding the machines.
To minimize opportunities for wicked plays on the part of any errant ORs, the following need to done:
The serial number of the candidates on the ballot list
should be random, rather than in alphabetical order, with the final assignment
done by lottery draws not more than a few hours before
polling. In fact the
control units as well as poll-units may be distributed to various poll booths
well before polling, as long as sequence of candidates is not known. As
mentioned above, without knowing the serial order of candidates, the control
units cannot be sabotages in favor of a desired candidate. All that will remain
is affixing the candidate lists on the poll units after their (candidates’)
order is determined by lottery in the presence of various candidate
representatives. Of course, copies will have to be made of the candidate lists
and transmitted to all of the polling booths in the hours before the commencement
of polling. If all of the polling booths are provided with fax machines, they
could receive the candidate lists as late as minutes before poll opening, and
yet be ready for the polls. In case enough fax machines are not available,
enough time may be allowed so that the lists may be brought over to the polling
booths from the nearest fax machines.
After the serial numbers have been assigned to candidates,
the control units
should never go out of sight of polling agents or other candidate representatives.
After each voter casts his/her
vote on a polling machine, a long beep is heard indicating registry of the
voter’s vote. The presiding officer (PO) is then supposed to press a control
key on the control unit to prepare the polling machine for accepting next
voter’s vote. Some of the illiterate voters may be dazed by the new gadget, and
may seek assistance of the PO. The PO may press a vote of his/her own
preference. If they are too unsophisticated to press the proper voting key,
they are likely to be too intimidated by the PO to protest against his/her
improper intervention or assistance, even if they notice the same.
Need for intervention may even be
manufactured by a crooked PO himself/herself. From time to time the dishonest
PO may not press the control key sufficiently. In such a case the next voter’s
vote will not get registered, and no beep will be heard, whereupon the voter
may seek help of the PO. The PO may discretely press the control key before
he/she goes to help the voter, and if the voter appears to be unsophisticated
enough, the PO may press the key of his/her own (PO’s) favorite candidate. The
illiterate voter would generally be too afraid of the PO to protest against
improper intervention/assistance.
To avoid such misconducts on the
part of a single PO per booth, triads mentioned earlier should replace them.
Best
way to reduce the chances of tampering after
the poll is to have voting in the whole country takes place on a single day in a single
phase, and take readings of vote counts off the control-units right at the
polling booths right after poll closure. This is what is done in most countries
where they use electronic voting machines. This obviates possibilities of sabotage during transportation of control
units and storage. Also, the question of results of earlier phases affecting
voting in subsequent phases does not arise in case of single-day single-phase
voting.
The
only reason
for not holding elections on one & the same day appears to be difficulty
in arranging for adequate security on the same day all over the country.
However, single-phase election eliminates the problems associated with safe
transportation of control modules and their safekeeping, saving us many
security personnel and transportation resources. This saving of personnel and
resources should be considered while judging single phase voting. It seems that
if RPF, army, navy and the air-force personnel, leaving aside those in the
border areas
and other sensitive areas, are
mobilized
and added to the local police,
enough security people will be available for single-phase election. All of the
earlier phases of voting already announced can be moved over to the last scheduled phase, giving only
relief rather than aggravation to various parties concerned.
If a single-phase election (in a
single day) is not a possibility at all, we will have to stick with the
scheduled multi-phase election. The only question is whether (1) the vote
counts should be taken off the control units right after polling of respective
phases, resulting in declaration of results as different phases are finished.
(2) Or, whether the control modules should be transported and stored in control
rooms for reading after all phases of polling all over India are finished.
The former, reading the control
units right after poll closures, has advantages as well as disadvantages, as
described below:
Disadvantages: Announcement of results
of the earlier phases, as used to be the practice prior to mid-1980s, may affect the polling of later phases. However, there
are no studies about the severity of effect of the earlier results on subsequent polling. The ensuing phases do get affected by the
earlier phases any way, by the exit polls, false or real. In the age of
Internet and other means of fast communication, speculation about the results
of the earlier phases can be stopped. However, we cannot
say that the effect of the real results of earlier polls is worse, on the succeeding polls, than the effect of speculations based on exit polls
of the earlier phases (tainted or otherwise). In any case, it is difficult to say that the results
of the earlier phases affect the later phases for the better or for the worse,
if at all they do affect.
Advantages: “Fairness” of the election, as well as “perception of fairness”, will improve with counting right
at closure of the polls. Security problems involved in transportation of the
control units and their safe keeping in the strong rooms will be obviated. The
advantage of “fairness” in election far outweighs the disadvantage of the
earlier phases affecting the next phases of election, particularly in
view of the fact that exit polls (false and/or real) are available to affect
the polls in the later phases, any way. A perception of “unfairness”
in counting the votes (even if unfounded) can severely jeopardize the faith of
the public in democracy itself.
In light of the above, even if the polls must be staggered
in several phases, counting should be done immediately after the poll closure,
right at the poll booths, rather than at the end of all phases.
1.
Replace all
individual officers responsible for any phase of the election by triads of
equals like the triads of Election Commissioners.
2.
Assign serial numbers
to various candidates by the draws of lotteries rather than in alphabetical
order. And the assignment should be made no more than just a few hours before
the commencement of polls, giving enough time for the candidate-lists to be
made and faxed over to all poll booths.
3.
To avoid misconducts
on the part of a single PO per booth, triads mentioned earlier should replace
each of them.
4.
Take readings off the
control units right after poll closures, no matter whether poll is held on a
single day or staggered over several phases.
Thanking you very much for your kind attention and
suitable action.
Sincerely
yours,
Dr. Satinath
Choudhary
President,
Better Democracy Forum
115 W 238
Street, The Bronx, New York 10463, USA
Copies sent to:
The President of Inida
The Prime Minister of India
The Home Minister of India
President of various parties
*****************************************